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Abstract  
Health Information Technology (HIT) has become an integral component 
of healthcare today. The HITECH Act (2009) and Meaningful Use objectives 
stand to bring wide-sweeping adoption and implementations of HIT in small, 
medium and large sized healthcare organizations across the country. Though 
recent literature has provided evidence for the benefits of HIT in the profession, 
there have also been a growing number of reports exploring the adverse effects of 
HIT. There has not, however, yet been a systematic account of the adverse effects 
of HIT in the healthcare system. The current push for HIT coupled with a lack of 
critical appraisal of the potential risks of implementation and deployment within 
the medical literature has led to a general unquestioning and unregulated 
acceptance of the implementation of technology in medicine and healthcare as a 
positive addition with little or no risk. While the benefits of HIT are clear, a 
review of the existing studies in the literature would provide a holistic vision of 
the adverse effects of HIT as well as the types and impact within the nation’s 
health care system to inform future HIT development and implementation. The 
development of a general understanding of these adverse effects can serve as a 
review and summary for the use of informatics professionals and clinicians 
implementing HIT as well as providing future direction for the industry in HIT 
implementations. Additionally, this study has value for moving forward in 
informatics to develop frameworks for implementation and guidelines and 
standards for development and regulation of HIT at a federal level.  
This study involves the use of an integrative literature review to identify 
and classify the adverse effects of HIT as reported in the literature. The purpose 
of this study is to perform an integrative review of the literature to 1) identify and 
classify the adverse effects of HIT; 2) determine the impact and prevalence of 
these effects; 3) identify the recommended actions and best practices to address 
the negative effects of HIT. 
This study analyzed 18 articles for HIT-induced error and adverse 
consequences. In the process, 228 errors and/or adverse consequences were 
identified, classified and represented in an operational taxonomic schema. The 
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taxonomic representation consisted of 8 master categories and 30 subcategories. 
Additionally, the prevalence and impact of these errors were evaluated as well as 
recommendations and best practices in future systems design. 
This study builds on previous work in the medical literature pertaining to 
HIT-induced errors and adverse consequences and offers a unique perspective in 
analyzing existing studies in the literature using the integrative review model of 
research. It is the first work in combining studies across healthcare technologies 
and analyzing the adverse consequences across 18 studies to form a cohesive 
classification of these events in healthcare technology. 
  
	   1	  
Introduction  
Problem Statement 
The effective implementation and deployment of health information 
technology in healthcare has increasingly become a high priority for the nation. 
Within the past decade, a number of agencies have called for the adoption of 
technologies to aid in automating and supporting the healthcare system. (Kohn, 
Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000; Reid, Compton, Grossman, & Fanjiang, 2005). 
Despite this call for action, adoption rates of health information technology 
remain low (Furukawa, Raghu, Spaulding, & Vinze, 2008; Jha et al., 2009; 
Pedersen & Gumpper, 2008) resulting in a massive number of health care entities 
as potential future adopters. Evidence of the benefits of HIT has been reported in 
the literature (Bates et al., 1998; Chaudhry et al., 2006; Poon et al., 2010) and the 
benefits of HIT are clear. But there is also evidence to the contrary of these 
reports (Ash et al., 2007b; Bates, 2005; Campbell, Sittig, Guappone, Dykstra, & 
Ash, 2007; Chaudhry et al., 2006; Himmelstein, Wright, & Woolhandler, 2010) - 
evidence that has begun the exploration of errors and adverse consequences of 
HIT. There has not, however, yet been a systematic account of HIT-induced 
errors in the healthcare system and the current push for HIT coupled with a lack 
of a critical appraisal of the potential risks of implementation (e.g. a review of the 
literature and existing studies) and deployment within the medical literature has 
led to a general unquestioning and unregulated acceptance of the implementation 
of technology in medicine and healthcare as a positive addition with little or no 
risk. (Karsh, Weinger, Abbott, & Wears, 2010) Given the potential spread of HIT 
initiatives in the nation coupled with the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act, the healthcare system stands to implement HIT more widely and at a quicker 
rate than ever. While automation in healthcare and HIT is beneficial, the wide 
spread adoption of HIT across the nation without properly assessing the risks and 
errors of past experiences potentiates an equally widespread epidemic of HIT-
related injuries, patient safety risks and medical failures. The importance in 
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understanding HIT-induced errors and adverse consequences has also been 
underscored in recent literature as a dire problem that must be addressed and 
understood in moving forward with HIT. (Coiera, Aarts, & Kulikowski, 2012; 
Karsh et al., 2010; Sittig & Singh, 2011) There is currently a movement to 
address these issues. A recent advisory report from the Institutes of Medicine 
(IOM), “Health IT and Patient Safety: Building Safer Systems for Better Care,” 
makes specific recommendations regarding the safety concerns in future 
development of HIT and highlights findings of HIT-induced errors and 
unintended consequences within the medical literature. (Safety, Technology, & 
Medicine, 2012) Understanding the implications of HIT and the potential for 
adverse effects in a complex system can aid in minimizing errors and preventing 
harm to the patient and healthcare professional. Moreover, the recognition of 
HIT-related errors and HIT-related adverse effects as well as a systematic 
approach to identifying and categorizing them can contribute to future efforts in 
standardization of development, regulation and implementation of HIT. 
Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this study is to perform an integrative review of the 
literature to 1) identify and classify the adverse effects of HIT; 2) determine the 
impact and prevalence of these effects; 3) and identify the recommended actions 
and best practices to address the adverse effects of HIT. 
Importance of the Study 
 The importance of this study lies in gaining a holistic vision of the adverse 
effects of HIT, the types of adverse effects and the impact of these effects within 
the nation’s health care system to inform future HIT development and 
implementation. Moving forward and implementing technologies and automation 
in medicine is critical to the success of medicine in the future. A development of a 
general understanding of these adverse effects can serve as a review and summary 
for the use of informatics professionals and clinicians implementing HIT. 
Additionally, this study provides value for moving forward in informatics to 
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develop frameworks for implementation and possible guidelines and standards for 
development and regulation of HIT at a federal level.   
Background and Literature Review  
Introduction 
 This study involves the use of an integrative literature review to identify 
and classify HIT-induced errors and adverse consequences as reported in the 
literature. As such, two preliminary topics are covered within this section – the 
integrative literature review and defining a medical error. A third and primary 
topic is also addressed – the adverse consequences of HIT and HIT-induced errors 
as reported in the medical literature. 
The Integrative Literature Review 
 The integrative review is a research design primarily used in nursing 
research that has emerged as a result of evidence-based practice (EBP) where 
studies with differing methodologies are often compared and contrasted to 
develop and synthesize results. (Beyea & Nicoll, 1998) It differs from the 
systematic review and meta-analysis in this respect and in the respect that it 
generally does not attempt to rank order or quantify the results. However, in 
certain instances qualitative results are analyzed separately from those results that 
can be quantitatively analyzed and the end results are presented for the different 
analyses. The advantage to using an integrative review design is that it allows for 
different study methodologies to be evaluated, compared and reported upon. 
(Beyea & Nicoll, 1998; Cooper & Cooper, 1998; Rodgers & Knafl, 2000; 
Whittemore & Knafl, 2005) The challenge in using this design is there has not 
been complete consensus among scholars on the methodology for the data 
analysis phase of integrated reviews. There is also not a clear consensus on what 
qualifies as an integrative review. Moreover, the evaluation of diverse sources of 
qualitative data with varying methodologies is a complex undertaking in itself not 
devoid of its own set of challenges. The nature of these studies is such that they 
do not lend well to the ranking or scoring procedures commonly used in reviews. 
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Finally, reaching a consensus on what represents quality in any review - whether 
systematic or integrative - presents a challenge.  
Defining a Medical Error 
 The subject of what constitutes a medical error or medication error has 
received ample attention in the literature. (Kalra, 2004; Lisby, Nielsen, Brock, & 
Mainz, 2010; Tamuz, 2004) Within the medical industry there is a wide degree of 
interpretation in terms of what constitutes an error and a fair amount of 
disagreement as to what a medical error is or is not. (Hofer, Kerr, & Hayward, 
2000) Hofer and colleagues write of the complexity in simply defining what an 
error is and how it is determined an error actually occurred. Their findings suggest 
a vague notion of what an error is and problems in the consistency of definitions. 
(2000) Lisby and colleagues came to the same conclusion when evaluating 
medication errors in a systematic review covering 45 studies. (Lisby et al., 2010) 
Given the propensity of differing definitions regarding what is and is not a 
medical error or medication error, it becomes an exercise in semantics to define 
an HIT-related error. Imposing a strict definition of error for this study becomes 
problematic for two reasons. First, there is clearly no agreed upon definition that 
could be employed. In the systematic review noted above, 26 of the 45 articles 
reviewed included significant variations in definitions. (2010) Second, there could 
be items that are not truly an error in nature. All unintended consequences are not 
errors. For example, Joan Ash reports on shifts in power as a result of HIT 
implementation. (Ash, Sittig, Campbell, Guappone, & Dykstra, 2006) A shift in 
power due to HIT implementation does not necessarily represent an error or even 
a potential error. This study would either be excluded or placed in a different 
category if strict definitions of errors were to be imposed. Thus this thesis used 
the definition specifically applied to HIT-induced errors proposed by Dean Sittig 
and Hardep Sing: (2011) 
“[an] HIT-related error occurs anytime HIT is unavailable for use, 
malfunctions during use, is used incorrectly by someone, or when HIT 
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interacts with another system or component incorrectly, resulting in data 
being lost or incorrectly entered, displayed or transmitted.” 
In addition, issues associated with adverse consequences, unintended 
consequences and sociotechnical problems associated with HIT are also included 
within this definition. They are not errors – as described above – but either 
potentiate an error (in most cases) or are important in their own right as adverse 
social issues resulting from less than desirable HIT implementations or design. 
Adverse Consequences of HIT 
There have been a number of studies and publications investigating or 
reporting on the adverse effects of HIT. One of the largest bodies of research 
comes from studies evaluating the unintended consequences of HIT. (Ash, Berg, 
& Coiera, 2004; Ash et al., 2006, 2007; Ash, Sittig, Dykstra, Campbell, & 
Guappone, 2007, 2009; Ash et al., 2007b; Campbell, Sittig, Ash, Guappone, & 
Dykstra, 2006; Harrison, Koppel, & Bar-Lev, 2007; Wachter, 2006) These studies 
have largely been attempts to understand sociotechnical relationships in 
healthcare and how these relationships often result in unforeseen consequences. 
They exist as an emerging inquiry into the unintended consequences resulting 
from the implementation of technology and the interaction of healthcare 
professionals with new technologies. 
 The earliest discussions of the unintended consequences in the healthcare 
literature do not focus on errors, but rather administrative aspects of HIT. One 
early article analyzing the benefits and detriments of electronic medical records, 
(Silverman, n.d.) cited two primary problems with electronic medical records – 
lack of privacy and the costs associated with implementation and upkeep. Though 
this latter category is reported on in later works by Joan Ash and her colleagues, 
(Ash et al., 2006; Ash et al., 2007a; Dykstra et al., 2009) Silverman’s article was 
brief and, at the time it was published, speculative. Wachter used the term 
“unforeseen consequences” in a general assessment of computerization in 
healthcare but maintained a focus on quality and safety in healthcare from 
primarily an administrative viewpoint. (Wachter, 2006) It was Ash and her 
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colleagues who spearheaded the research on unintended consequences with her 
studies beginning in 2003 (Ash et al., 2004) and explored unintended 
consequences first as part of research including three different countries across 
the United States, Europe and Australia. Ash’s research into the problems 
associated with the implementation of information technology resulted largely in 
a set of descriptive categories. These categories were essential for understanding 
the effects of technology both good and bad. The results were the first attempt at 
categorizing the errors resulting from the unintended consequences of 
implementation of technology. However, they are far from a complete accounting 
of the adverse effects of HIT in the medical literature. The intent of Ash’s initial 
study concerned gathering qualitative data in institutions using Patient Care 
Information Systems. In gathering and analyzing the data, the observers began to 
discover patterns indicating there existed possibilities of errors occurring within 
these systems or there were attitudes reflecting this knowledge amongst those 
interviewed. (2004) This initiated a series of related studies to both analyze the 
existing data from new perspectives and obtain more data. (Ash et al., 2006, 2007; 
Ash et al., 2007, 2009; Ash et al., 2007a, 2007b) The body of work Ash and her 
colleagues produced provided insight into: 
 The types or categories of unintended consequences 
 Types of unintended consequences specific to clinical decision 
support systems (CDS) and Computerized Provider Order Entry 
(CPOE) 
 Sociological consequences of the implementation of HIT 
 An attempt to quantify the importance of the types of unintended 
consequences 
 A picture of the extent or prevalence of unintended consequences 
 Solutions and implementation recommendations 
Ash and her colleagues later developed an 8-question survey designed to 
determine the extent or prevalence of the types of unintended consequences and to 
determine the overall level of importance of each type to hospitals with 
implemented Computerized Provider Order Entry. (2009) One hundred and 
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seventy-six interviews were conducted via telephone. Rated the highest in terms 
of importance were system demands on the staff, communication and workflow 
issues. The lowest rating went to shifts in power and new types of errors that HIT 
could cause. Most interesting to note is there did not appear to be any correlation 
between the length of time each hospital had owned the CPOE system and 
unintended consequences as a result of the system. This suggests adverse effects 
can exist in systems regardless of how long they have been using HIT 
underscoring the importance of this research. Ash and colleagues also noted there 
were both positive and negative unintended consequences involved in 
implementation of CPOE and that hospitals can either work to avoid the negative 
unintended consequences or simply accept them as part of developing a new 
system.  
Ash and her colleague’s work serves as a body of research for informing 
HIT-related adverse effects. But as noted above, it does not serve as a complete 
representation nor a singular body of work on the subject. It was also largely 
informed through the use of qualitative methods – specifically, ethnography and 
surveys. Other studies exist that have used quantitative methods and other forms 
of qualitative data collection. 
Harrison investigated unintended consequences from a sociotechnical 
perspective (Harrison et al., 2007) evaluating five interactive sociotechnical 
analysis types. However, this research was focused on filtering the unintended 
consequences and HIT-related errors through an analytical framework and not 
classifying or evaluating the types of errors. The authors attempted to construct a 
model for the prevention of HIT-induced errors using the framework. 
The bulk of research in HIT-induced errors can be found in the literature 
evaluating CPOE systems. Ash and her colleagues work was central to the CPOE, 
but investigated the unintended consequences. A number of studies have been 
published in recent years evaluating the types of errors found in a given CPOE 
system.  
One study performed by Yan Han and colleagues (Han et al., 2005) 
originating in the Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh reported an increase of 
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3.77percent in mortality after the implementation of a CPOE. This study 
generated concern in the field of medicine because it was an unexpected outcome 
of HIT. The study gained such attention it was later commented on by Dean Sittig 
and Joan Ash in a commentary published in the same journal. (Sittig, Ash, Zhang, 
Osheroff, & Shabot, 2006) A study published that same year, however, showed a 
significant decrease in mortality after implementation of a CPOE. (Del Beccaro, 
Jeffries, Eisenberg, & Harry, 2006) An expert panel was then constructed to 
evaluate the two studies and develop an understanding of the differences in 
results. (Ammenwerth et al., 2006) The primary findings showed the two studies 
were difficult to compare due to differing study designs and sampling. Also, the 
Han study had implemented their CPOE in a six-day time period rather than using 
a slow implementation process. The primary recommendation of this paper was to 
ensure a sociotechnical approach was taken in implementation that would 
recognize the differences within organizations and to ensure future informatics 
professionals are educated in these approaches. 
 Ross Koppel and his colleagues conducted a study using both quantitative 
and qualitative methods to examine the effects of CPOE on medication errors. 
(Koppel et al., 2005) Their study resulted in finding 22 different classes of errors, 
which they then divided into two large categories –interface issues and 
information errors due to faulty systems implementation and integration. The 
information related errors largely revolved around medication administration and 
medication reconciliation. Some of these errors underscored a clear lack of 
foresight into who would use the system and how it would (or should) be used. 
For example, dosing of medications was set from a pharmacy purchasing 
perspective so that the medications were listed in the system as they were ordered 
from suppliers. This meant a single dose could be more or less than what was 
standard for the physician or clinic. This resulted in both under and overdosing 
patients. There were also scheduling problems with the cancellation of medication 
orders and renewal of medications. Within the system cancelling a medication 
was a different process than medication renewal (lack of consistency) meaning 
the system was prone to errors if the physician forgot to complete the entire 
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process. An alert process for allergy medicines failed to notify the physician until 
after the order was sent meaning in a highly interruptive environment, the alert 
could possibly never be seen. Errors with the interface included unclear log-on 
and log-off procedures (lack of feedback) where physicians could potentially 
enter orders under another physician’s id. Other errors included simultaneous 
charting, improper alerts and errors in which the procedures in the institution are 
subjugated or ignored. The study findings confirmed what Ash and colleagues 
(Ash et al., 2007a) found and what Ammenwerth and colleagues (Ammenwerth et 
al., 2006) recommend – sociotechnical approaches are necessary to address these 
errors prior to implementation. 
 Zahra Niazkhani and colleagues conducted a qualitative study focused on 
the workarounds using a CPOE system. (Niazkhani, Pirnejad, van der Sijs, & 
Aarts, 2011) The majority of workarounds identified through their research were 
related to system location. In the study setting, systems were not available at 
bedside. This caused cognitive overload forcing professionals to memorize orders 
and documentation elements until they could access a system. In addition, there 
were several equipment related problems to include issues with printers not 
printing the forms and labels, which in some instances could cause missed orders. 
Communication problems were noted as well. Orders in the system would often 
be placed with no verbal communication to the recipient. In many instances, 
nurses may not understand physicians’ orders when reading them after submission 
forcing them to contact the physician and delaying treatment. Other 
communication problems were the system’s lack of notification for high priority 
orders. A common problem with many systems in healthcare is the illusion of 
communication reported on in a number of studies (Ash et al., 2004; Campbell et 
al., 2006; Patterson, 2002) where healthcare professionals assume that placing an 
order in the system equates to the order being acted upon or carried out. 
Nizakhani and colleagues also found problems with workflow where the system 
did not match the flow of work in a given clinic or medical setting. For example, 
verbal orders were not supported in the system and the system did not allot for 
emergency situations where orders could be entered at a later time with the 
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time/date stamp adjusted to reflect the actual time of medication administration. 
Finally, there were a number of issues involving information design or interface 
design – specifically with labels. Labels for charts and orders were not designed 
well and difficult to read with same-sized font or hard to read font size. In 
addition, they were highly detailed and included too much information. These 
issues all combined synergistically to cause a number of workarounds for the 
CPOE system and provide numerous examples of shortcomings in the design of 
the system. 
 Another study investigated the use of CPOE in pediatric units. (Walsh et 
al., 2006) The authors studied 352 randomly selected pediatric admissions and 
retroactively reviewed these admissions for errors. They discovered 104 total 
errors, 20 of which were computer-related – 7 of which were considered serious. 
The majority of the errors discovered involved problems associated with poor 
interface design. Selection of the wrong medication via the dropdown menu was 
common with juxtaposition errors – wrong dose, wrong medication or wrong 
patient selected – at the forefront of the causes. Duplicate medication errors, 
keypad entry errors and problems with the default selection of order sets were 
described as well. This study represented a very small set of computer-related 
errors in the use of CPOE, but does confirm other findings related to HIT-induced 
errors and adverse effects in the use of CPOE. (Ash et al., 2004; Ash et al., 2007; 
Campbell, Guappone, Sittig, Dykstra, & Ash, 2009; Campbell et al., 2006; 
Koppel et al., 2005; Santell, Kowiatek, Weber, Hicks, & Sirio, 2009; Wetterneck 
et al., 2011) 
 John Santell and his colleagues retroactively reviewed MEDMARX data 
to evaluate CPOE-related errors submitted to the database for 693 unique 
facilities. (Santell et al., 2009) They discovered a number of problems discussed 
previously in this review to include juxtaposition errors, errors in dosing due to 
incorrect algorithms, dosing and omission errors as well as unclear computer 
generated labels as discussed above. In addition, they discovered a number of 
errors resulting from distraction or interruption, inconsistencies in measurements 
(height and weight), improperly trained temporary staff, false alerts and wrong 
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dates and times entered into the system. This study concentrated on “non-
prescribers” and adds numerous error types to the CPOE error-related literature. 
 Tosha Wetterneck and her colleagues conducted an analysis of duplicate 
medication errors in a CPOE system with CDS in two intensive care units (ICUs). 
They analyzed the system across 4,147 patient days prior to implementation and 
4,013 after implementation discovering a 5.5 percent increase in errors post-
implementation. The problems they cite in system design include poor alert 
design, alert fatigue, system errors in detecting and/or preventing duplicate orders, 
an inability to view a patient’s medication history in a single place (leading to 
errors in prescribing) and system rigidity in allowing different order routes to be 
selected and changed during the patient’s care. In addition, they discovered 
problems with the interface design and default order sets leading to duplicate 
medication orders and thus errors in overprescribing. The default order set allows 
multiple prescriptions to be placed in a single keystroke. The problem occurs 
when the system does not recognize a duplicate order coming from the default set.  
 While CPOE represents the bulk of the research in HIT-induced errors, 
Bar Code Medication Administration (BCMA) is a closely related technology 
receiving less attention in the medical literature. There have been relatively few 
rigorous studies analyzing the errors and adverse consequences resulting from the 
use of these systems. The majority of the literature surrounding the use of BCMA 
systems focuses on associated misuse or workarounds. 
 Koppel and colleagues conducted a study to evaluate the prevalence, 
causes and problems associated with patient safety as a result of BCMA 
workarounds. (Koppel, Wetterneck, Telles, & Karsh, 2008) This study represents 
the richest set of data acquired on the use of BCMA systems in the medical 
literature. In it, the authors identify 15 types of BCMA workarounds and 31 
causes for the workarounds. Their research spanned across five hospitals using 
BCMA. They utilized various methods of qualitative data collection to include log 
analysis, interviews and observation methods. The study identified a number of 
interface and design issues with the technology including imperceptible error 
beeps (or beeps that indicated an error and could not be heard in a loud 
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environment), multiple screens needed to complete a single action, being timed 
out due to a preset administration time and inability to find the right information 
in the system. In addition, there were clear failures of the system that were 
problematic including connectivity issues, BCMA failure, barcode defects and 
problems reading barcodes or missing barcodes. The fact that BCMA extends the 
amount of time related to administering a medication leads to user dissatisfaction 
and problems in the efficiency of workflow. There were also issues in training 
where employees did not value the system for its safety impact or even realize the 
safety measures the system puts in place. A final issue was the rigidity of the 
BCMA system as it forced users through a linear and singular process in order to 
achieve administration of medication. 
 In an analysis of 2,783 errors reported to MEDMARX across 65 hospitals 
or health systems, Gary Cochran and his colleagues analyzed errors presented by 
and caused by BCMA systems. (Cochran, Jones, Brockman, Skinner, & Hicks, 
2007) Nearly half of the errors identified were a result of mislabeled medicines or 
medicines missing a barcode. A related error was an inability to read the barcode 
as evidenced in the Koppel article above. In addition, there were issues where the 
system was not available and numerous workarounds documented in the database.  
 A smaller study conducted by Emily Patterson and her colleagues 
observed 33 nurses over an 81-hour period of time to analyze BCMA systems. 
(Patterson, 2002) They discovered usability problems with the interface, 
workarounds and failure of BCMA systems. They also identified coordination 
issues as a result of using the BCMA where it failed to highlight high priority 
medications and issues in communication between physicians and nurses resulting 
in coordination problems in patient care. A lack of flexibility in the system also 
caused problems where the system did not always match the workflow. In 
addition, the system often changed the workflow since there was a measure in 
place to monitor the administration of medications and whether they were 
administered on time. In many instances, nurses would rush to administer 
medicines so as not to be highlighted in the system as administering medications 
late. This became problematic when there were higher priority issues the nurses 
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should have been attending to, but were, instead, more worried about being 
monitored and reported on. 
 A body of work in HIT-induced errors that is, perhaps, the most complete 
representation is the work of Farah Magrabi and her colleagues. (Magrabi, Ong, 
Runciman, & Coiera, 2010, 2012) They have analyzed more than 500 different 
HIT-related errors in two different medical databases – the FDA’s MAUDE 
database and Australia’s AIMS incident reporting database. As a result, they have 
developed a categorical system of 36 different types of errors that stand as a 
framework for categorizing HIT-induced errors. Their system groups the 36 errors 
into five primary categories – Machine Input Problems, Machine Information 
Transfer Problems, Machine Output Problems, General Technical Problems and 
Human Contributing Factors as a Problem. This is a close representation of what 
this thesis attempts to produce. However, a shortcoming of this categorical 
schema is it does not adequately represent the sociotechnical factors involved in 
HIT-induced errors and adverse consequences. Nonetheless, this research is 
immensely valuable to the medical informatics profession as well as being a 
valuable resource to inform this study. 
In addition to studies detailing the errors and adverse consequences of 
HIT, there have been a number of articles published in recent years from 
prominent voices in the medical informatics community calling for increased 
attention and efforts to HIT implementations, safety concerns and adverse effects 
of HIT. (Coiera et al., 2012; Karsh et al., 2010; Sittig & Singh, 2010, 2011) These 
are articles that propose new frameworks, summarize the effects of HIT or voice 
concerns over the current state of affairs with HIT in medicine. 
A recent article from the Journal of the American Informatics Society 
(Karsh et al., 2010) provides an analysis of the adverse effects of HIT detailing 
what the authors consider to be nine HIT “fallacies.” These fallacies illustrate 
potential and real problems stemming from the implementation of HIT. This 
article does not synthesize the research that has been completed in this area or 
present the types of the adverse effects of HIT in healthcare. Rather, the authors 
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are using what they term as HIT fallacies to call for increased regulation in the 
development and implementation of HIT. 
Enrico Coiera details the state of affairs in healthcare and the plan for 
mass implementation for HIT in the future. (Coiera et al., 2012) He outlines the 
barriers and challenges that will occur in implementing HIT on a wide scale in the 
United States. In addition, he outlines the factors of HIT that increase harm and 
those that reduce harm calling for attention to these factors as HIT is developed 
and implemented.  
Dean Sittig and Hardeep Singh have recently initiated work developing a 
framework for “understanding the complex origins of health information errors” 
and have worked to develop a sociotechnical model for measuring and 
understanding HIT-induced errors. (Sittig & Singh, 2009, 2010, 2011) In addition, 
they have sought to define an HIT-induced error as noted in the above section – 
Defining a Medical Error. 
 The research involving HIT-related errors spans more than a decade and is 
a testament to an increasing set of problems healthcare will face as it develops a 
closer relationship with HIT and a greater reliance. To date, there has been no 
major attempt to review the literature and compile the studies reporting on these 
adverse effects. Synthesizing the findings, coding and analyzing them will 
provide a lens through which to view implementations, developments and how 
healthcare will move forward in the decade to come.  
Methodology 
This study involved three primary stages. The first stage involved the 
location and selection of pertinent articles reporting HIT-induced errors. Once 
these articles were located and selected, the next stage involved coding the data. 
Validating the data represented the third stage of the study and as such, each stage 
receives due attention below. This section is split into three parts – The Literature 
Review, Coding the Studies and Validating the Coding. 
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Literature Review 
 The literature review for this study involved three primary stages – the 
initial literature search, a secondary search that built on the primary search and the 
selection of articles as a third stage. Selection of the articles to include the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria was an iterative process where the criteria were 
refined and defined over a series of stages.  
A literature review was conducted between the months of May and July of 
2012 to locate articles reporting on HIT-induced errors and adverse consequences 
of HIT. MEDLINE, CINAHL and Embase were searched using the key terms 
listed in Table 1. These databases were chosen for their broad coverage of the 
literature in the medical sciences. MEDLINE/Pubmed was chosen on the rationale 
it includes one of the broadest selections of journals in the medical field. 
CINHAL was chosen in an attempt to obtain studies within the nursing literature 
that may not have overlapped with the coverage of journals in MEDLINE. 
Embase was chosen due to it’s focus on medicine and pharmacological literature 
and the relationship of this study to CPOE systems.   
 
Table 1 Literature Search Key Terms 
Health Information Technology      + Errors and Adverse Consequences 
 Clinical Pharmacy Information 
Systems 
 Hospital Information Systems 
 Decision Support Systems 
 Computerized Decision Support 
 Medical Records Systems, 
Computerized 
 Electronic Health Records 
 Computerized Medical Record 
 Medical Order Entry Systems 
 Automation  
 Information Systems 
 Error 
 Medical Error 
 Medication Error 
 Unintended Consequences 
 E-iatrogenesis 
 Equipment Failure 
 
 
A unique search strategy was employed where subject headings and 
keyword search were both used. Subject headings aided in locating those articles 
already indexed within the article database while keyword searching aided in 
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locating more recent articles that had not yet been indexed. In addition, the 
bibliographies of selected or pertinent articles were mined in an effort to locate 
related articles. Reverse citation searches were also completed using the Web of 
Science as a search tool. The reverse citation searches were completed on selected 
articles to locate additional pertinent sources. This strategy enabled a maximum 
return on the search garnering the greatest number of articles possible. 
The inclusion and exclusion criteria were initially set broad to garner the 
greatest number of articles for review, as this was an obscure category unlikely to 
return massive results in the outset of the search. The initial criteria were: 
 
1. The article must – as a primary focus – report on: CPOE, CDSS, or HIT. 
HIT will include technologies used to provide patient care. Examples 
would be Patient Information Systems, Medication Dispensing Cabinets, 
Bar Code Readers etc. 
2. The article must also report on Errors, Unintended Consequences, 
Unanticipated Consequences, Adverse Events and/or Latent or Active 
Failures of HIT Systems. 
3. Articles published from 1990 to 2012. 
 
These initial criteria allowed maximum inclusion for the initial search and a 
refined set of criteria was developed and used after the initial search. This refined 
set of criteria was based on the findings and mass of articles located for the 
review. In addition, the revision of the search criteria came at the advice of a 
thesis committee member to enhance the sense of quality in the articles as well as 
develop a manageable number of studies for coding. The refined criteria were 
developed after the initial search and evaluation of articles. These criteria can be 
located in Tables 2 and 3. The criteria were strictly adhered to with the exception 
of a single paper by Joan Ash and colleagues, (2004) which used a Delphi style 
study design to reach a committee consensus on data. This paper offered a rich set 
of categories for Unintended Consequences as a result of HIT and was included 
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since it did include methods of data analysis consistent with qualitative data 
analysis. 
 
Table 2: Exclusion Criteria 
Exclude Notes 
Non-english   
Book Chapters, Conference 
Proceedings, Commentaries, 
Editorials, Preliminary Results 
Exception Ash et al. (2004 )  
No Abstract   
Systematic Reviews, Reviews of the 
Literature and Integrated Reviews - 
these types of articles are primarily 
used to obtain original studies via 
bibliographic analysis 
The exception to this rule is in rare 
cases where the synthesis of the 
literature results in a qualitative 
categorical schema that can be readily 
used for the current Integrated Review 
- or - a Systematic Review that adds 
new information to the topic 
Does not report on specific errors or 
specific categories of errors - Lacks 
clarity or details about the errors to 
include the cause of the error or how 
it is a result of technology  
Example: It does not help to know the 
physician chose the wrong drug 15 
times using the CPOE. It only helps if 
we know they chose the wrong drug as 
the result of faulty arrangement in a 
drop down menu. 
Is not complete in listing technology-
induced errors 
Example: Study that identifies 26 
errors yet only provides 8 examples of 
the types or errors  
Usability Studies / Simulations Despite the usefulness of these studies, 
this research was meant to be based on 
real errors. 
 
 
Table 3: Inclusion Criteria 
Inclusion Criteria Notes 
Published 2002 - 2012 CPOE, BCMA and CDS have evolved 
significantly in the past decade. Articles 
older than 10 years truly represent early 
generations of these technologies and 
many were in stages of infancy. 
Is a Peer Reviewed Journal   
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Reports on Technology-Induced 
errors, adverse or unintended 
consequences of HIT or New Types 
of Errors introduced through HIT as 
sole focal point of article 
There are a number of excluded articles 
addressing the benefits of the CPOE that 
list only a few “new types of errors” 
introduced as a result of the 
implementation. These articles are out of 
scope and insufficient in terms of the 
focus as they offer incomplete 
information and do not add to the study 
findings. 
Empirical studies reporting actual, 
observed or recorded errors 
Study was designed as an attempt to 
review potential errors, discrepancies, 
latent failures 
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Coding The Studies 
The studies were coded using an iterative process to flesh out a schema 
that could be used to code all articles. A four-stage process was used to code the 
articles with each stage culminating in an evaluation of progress and validation.  
The first stage began with an initial article to develop a rough set of 
categories and to validate a coding process. The article used in the first stage was 
Koppel’s article studying CPOE. (Koppel et al., 2005) This article was chosen as 
an initial article at the suggestion of a thesis committee member and for its 
thorough coverage of errors in CPOE. The coding and categories were validated 
using the thesis committee for audting.  The categories developed from this initial 
coding were used as a starting point and in coding future articles.  
The second stage of the process involved coding two additional articles 
chosen for the diversity of their content in that they offered coverage of HIT-
induced errors beyond CPOE and covered errors across healthcare system types. 
These two articles were coded with the Koppel article and to determine how well 
a coding schema would work using articles involving different types of HIT. The 
articles chosen were Emily Campbell and colleagues’ article (Campbell et al., 
2006) studying unintended consequences and Farah Magrabi and colleague’s 
article studying patient safety issues from the AIMS database. (Magrabi et al., 
2010) The three articles were coded using the set of categories initially developed 
through the Koppel article. When a category did not exist for an article, a new one 
was assigned. This allowed the categorical schema to be filled out as the coding 
process continued. At the conclusion of the second stage of coding, the studies 
and their resulting codes were validated with a member of the thesis committee.  
This initial categorical schema was supplemented with a framework 
developed by Elizabeth Borycki and colleagues, “A Framework for Diagnosing 
Technology Induced Errors in Healthcare.” (Borycki, Kushniruk, Keay, & Kuo, 
2009) Briefly, this framework is built on James Reason’s Theory of Human Error 
and the Swiss Cheese Model of Human Error (Figure 1) where there is a sharp 
end (where the error occurs, usually performed by an individual) and a blunt end 
(where the error originates or where latent conditions exist and act in forming the 
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error). (Reason, 2000) In Reason’s model, an error at the blunt end can occur as a 
result of organizational policies, software programming errors, design or any 
number of problems existing as a result of regulations or systemic problems in the 
beginning stages of development. At the blunt end, errors are not obvious. They 
are merely conditions predisposing an error at the blunt end. These problems are 
essentially “built into” the system and the conditions can then be carried 
throughout a system eventually resulting in a sharp end error. The sharp end is 
where the error actually occurs and usually involves a human. Additionally, 
systems are often modeled off existing systems or systems that are to be replaced 
with the newly programmed system. When these existing or older systems contain 
errors, it is common for errors in the old system to be modeled and built into the 
newer system. This framework was used as a guide in categorizing study errors. It 
is important to note: In many instances, studies do not offer a root cause analysis 
or a method to gain insight as to the root of an error. As such, this framework 
could only be used as a guide in categorization and is covered further in the 
discussion below. 
The third stage of the coding process involved a selection of five articles 
for coding and validation, once again, against the framework described above and 
the coding developed as a result of using the framework. These articles were 
chosen from the total pool of articles selected for the study and were selected, 
once again, based on the diversity of their content and richness of data so as to 
provide a full representation of HIT-induced error categories. At the conclusion of 
this stage, the final studies were coded for a fourth stage.  
In addition to coding the errors, the studies were also analyzed for the 
recommended actions to reduce the errors reported on, address adverse 
consequences of HIT or improve information systems in healthcare. These 
recommendations were compiled and trended to develop a cohesive set of 
recommendations for the reduction of HIT-induced errors and adverse 
consequences as well as recommended actions for future HIT development. 
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Figure 1: Swiss Cheese Model of Human Error 
 
Validation 
 Qualitative data validation can be done through a variety of methods to 
enhance the rigor of the analysis and ensure solidity in the codification of data. 
(Patton, 1999) This study used two different methods of validation. The first 
method used a member of the thesis committee to oversee and audit the 
codification of study data. The second method utilized the authors of the studies 
to validate codification. This method has been cited in the literature and is an 
appropriate measure of validation given the nature and constraints of this thesis. 
(1999) 
As noted above, the article coding was validated using an iterative process 
with the thesis committee in the first stage and one thesis committee member in 
the second and third stage of the coding. The fourth stage of coding used the 
second form of validation where the authors of studies were contacted to validate 
coding of errors from their studies. 
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 Once all of the studies were coded, the authors of each study were 
contacted. Each author was given their data and a coding guide to inform them of 
the nature and details of the thesis. There were fourteen authors, total. Three 
authors could not be contacted due to faulty contact information, old contact 
information or they had moved on from research. Of the eleven remaining 
authors, ten agreed to review how their studies were coded and whether they 
agreed with the categorization. This comprised the final measure of validation for 
this thesis. 
Results 
Summary 
The results section is divided into three parts. The literature search 
discusses the resulting number of articles located and the subsequent weeding 
process through the use of inclusion and exclusion criteria. The Classification of 
HIT-Induced Errors and Adverse Consequences section discusses the categorical 
schema developed and the resulting classification. The Prevalence and Impact of 
HIT-Induced Errors and Adverse Consequences section discusses the results of 
the coding with descriptive statistics to provide a summary of the impact and 
prevalence of problems found within the group of studies. Last, the 
Recommended Actions and Best Practices for Addressing HIT-Induced Errors 
and Adverse Consequences are presented.  
Literature Search 
 The literature search resulted in 866 total articles available for review 
using the search terms described above. Of these, 55 were selected for manual 
review of abstracts and titles. Based on the inclusion and exclusion criteria, 45 of 
the articles were excluded leaving a total of 10 studies for review. The 
bibliographies of these 10 studies were then examined for pertinent articles 
garnering 3 additional articles. A reverse citation search was then employed on 
the 13 articles to net 5 additional articles for a total of 18 articles returned (n = 18) 
for evaluation and inclusion in the study. These 18 articles were then used as the 
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basis for the coding and categorization (Figure 2). Table 4 lists the articles 
selected for the integrated review. 
  
Figure 2: Literature Search Results 
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Table 4: Selected Studies for Integrated Review 
Authors System(s) 
Studied 
Hospital(s) Profile Methods / Data Sources 
Ash, J. S., Berg, M., & Coiera, E. (2004). Some unintended 
consequences of information technology in health care: The nature 
of patient care information system-related errors. Journal of the 
American Medical Informatics Association : JAMIA, 11(2), 104-
12. 
Multiple 
Types - 
Multiple 
Data Sets 
4 US Hospitals, 
Australian Hospital, 
Dutch 2 hospitals  
Qualitative Analysis - Literature 
Review and Field Notes from 
Qualitative Research Conducted by 
the Authors, Quantitative Data from 
Dutch Hospitals 
Ash JS, Sittig DF, Dykstra RH, Guappone K, Carpenter JD, and 
Seshadri V. Ash, J. S., Sittig, D. F., Dykstra, R. H., Guappone, K., 
Carpenter, J. D., & Seshadri, V. (2007). Categorizing the 
unintended sociotechnical consequences of computerized provider 
order entry. International Journal of Medical Informatics, 76 Suppl 
1, S21-7. 
CPOE   1 US Hospital, 4 
outpatient clinics 
Qualitative Analysis - Interviews and 
Ethnographic Observations 
Campbell, E. M., Sittig, D. F., Ash, J. S., Guappone, K. P., & 
Dykstra, R. H. (2006). Types of unintended consequences related 
to computerized provider order entry. Journal of the American 
Medical Informatics Association : JAMIA, 13(5), 547-56. 
CPOE    5 US Hospitals in 3 
different organizations 
Qualitative Analysis - Participant 
Observation, Semi-Structured Oral 
History Interviews and Transcriptions 
from a 2 Day Conference on 
Unintended and Adverse 
Consequences 
Campbell, E. M., Guappone, K. P., Sittig, D. F., Dykstra, R. H., & 
Ash, J. S. (2009). Computerized provider order entry adoption: 
Implications for clinical workflow. Journal of General Internal 
Medicine, 24(1), 21-6. 
CPOE   5 US Hospitals in 3 
different organizations 
Qualitative Analysis - Semi-
Structured Oral History Interviews 
and Ethnography 
Cochran, G. L., Jones, K. J., Brockman, J., Skinner, A., & Hicks, 
R. W. (2007). Errors prevented by and associated with bar-code 
medication administration systems. Joint Commission Journal on 
Quality and Patient Safety/Joint Commission Resources, 33(5), 
293. 
BCMA 65 US Hospitals / 
Health Systems 
Qualitative Analysis - Error Reports 
from MEDMARX 
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Eslami S, Abu-Hanna A, de Keizer NF, and de Jonge E. Eslami, 
S., Abu-Hanna, A., de Keizer, N. F., & de Jonge, E. (2006). Errors 
associated with applying decision support by suggesting default 
doses for aminoglycosides. Drug Safety, 29(9), 803-809.  
EMR - 
PDMS 
(Patient Data 
Management 
System) 
1 Dutch Tertiary Care 
Hospital, Adult 28 bed 
ICU 
Qualitative Analysis - Retrospective 
Evaluation of System Data 
Han, Y. Y., Carcillo, J. A., Venkataraman, S. T., Clark, R. S. B., 
Watson, R. S., Nguyen, T. C., . . . Orr, R. A. (2005). Unexpected 
increased mortality after implementation of a commercially sold 
computerized physician order entry system. Pediatrics, 116(6), 
1506. 
CPOE   1 US Children’s 
Hospital 235 beds 
Quantitative Analysis - mortality rate 
before and after implementation  
Horsky, J., Kuperman, G. J., & Patel, V. L. (2005). 
Comprehensive analysis of a medication dosing error related to 
CPOE. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 
12(4), 377-382. 
CPOE 1 US Hospital, ICU Qualitative Analysis - Case Study (log 
analysis, interviews and heuristic 
evaluation of CPOE interface) 
Koppel, R., Metlay, J. P., Cohen, A., Abaluck, B., Localio, A. R., 
Kimmel, S. E., & Strom, B. L. (2005). Role of computerized 
physician order entry systems in facilitating medication errors. 
JAMA : The Journal of the American Medical Association, 
293(10), 1197. 
CPOE   1 US Teaching 
Hospital 750 beds 
Qualitative Analysis - One-on-One 
Interviews, Focus Groups, Expert 
Interview, Shadowing, Survey 
Koppel, R., Wetterneck, T., Telles, J. L., & Karsh, B. T. (2008). 
Workarounds to barcode medication administration systems: Their 
occurrences, causes, and threats to patient safety. Journal of the 
American Medical Informatics Association : JAMIA, 15(4), 408-
23. 
BCMA 1 US Hospital (470 
bed), 4 Hospital 
Healthcare System 
(929 bed) 
Qualitative Analysis - Structure 
Observations & Shadowing, 
Unstructured & Semi-structured 
Interviews, Participation in Hospital 
Staff Meetings about BCMA, Data 
Log Review, Failure Mode & Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) 
Magrabi, F., Ong, M. S., Runciman, W., & Coiera, E. (2010). An 
analysis of computer-related patient safety incidents to inform the 
development of a classification. Journal of the American Medical 
Informatics Association : JAMIA, 17(6), 663-70. 
Multiple 
Types - 
AIMS Data 
8 Australian Hospitals Qualitative Analysis - Patient Safety 
Incidents Reported via AIMS 
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Magrabi, F., Ong, M. S., Runciman, W., & Coiera, E. (2012). 
Using FDA reports to inform a classification for health 
information technology safety problems. Journal of the American 
Medical Informatics Association : JAMIA, 19(1), 45-53. 
Multiple 
Types - FDA 
Data 
Multiple  Qualitative Analysis - 1100 reports 
via MAUDE Database  
McDonald CJ. McDonald, C. J. (2006). Computerization can 
create safety hazards: A bar-coding near miss. Annals of Internal 
Medicine, 144(7), 510-6. 
BCMA 1 US Hospital    Case Study  
Niazkhani, Z., Pirnejad, H., van der Sijs, H., & Aarts, J. (2011). 
Evaluating the medication process in the context of CPOE use: 
The significance of working around the system. International 
Journal of Medical Informatics, 80(7), 490-506. 
CPOE   1 Netherlands 
Academic Hospital 
(1237 beds) 
Qualitative Analysis - Transcripts of 
Interviews with End-users, Document 
Analysis, Educational/Training 
Material Analysis 
Patterson, . S. (2002). Improving patient safety by identifying side 
effects from introducing bar coding in medication administration. 
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 9(5), 
540-553. 
BCMA VA - Acute Care and 
Nursing Home Wards, 
3 Hospitals 
Qualitative Analysis - Ethnographic 
Observation Before and After BCMA 
Implementation 
Santell, J. P., Kowiatek, J. G., Weber, R. J., Hicks, R. W., & Sirio, 
C. A. (2009). Medication errors resulting from computer entry by 
nonprescribers. American Journal of Health-system Pharmacy : 
AJHP : Official Journal of the American Society of Health-System 
Pharmacists, 66(9), 843-53. 
CPOE   Multiple – 693 
Unique Facilities 
Quantitative Analysis - MEDMARX 
Records 
Walsh, K. E., Adams, W. G., Bauchner, H., Vinci, R. J., Chessare, 
J. B., Cooper, M. R., . . . Landrigan, C. P. (2006). Medication 
errors related to computerized order entry for children. Pediatrics, 
118(5), 1872-9. 
CPOE   1 US 40-bed Teaching 
Hospital 
Quantitative Analysis - 352 Randomly 
selected inpatient pediatric admissions 
retrospectively reviewed 3 to 12 
months after implementation 
Wetterneck, T. B., Walker, J. M., Blosky, M. A., Cartmill, R. S., 
Hoonakker, P., Johnson, M. A., . . . Carayon, P. (2011). Factors 
contributing to an increase in duplicate medication order errors 
after CPOE implementation. Journal of the American Medical 
Informatics Association : JAMIA, 18(6), 774-82. 
CPOE   1 US Teaching 
Hospital 400-bed 
Qualitative Analysis - 4147 patient 
days prior to implementation and 
4013 patient days after 
implementation 
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Classification of HIT-Induced Errors and Adverse Consequences  
The articles netted 228 points of data coded. As noted above, the codes 
were developed iteratively with each error being coded into an initial set of 11 
master categories. The 11 master categories were developed using categories 
within the articles used for coding and developing the extracted errors into themes 
through the coding process. These themes were trended and error categories were 
developed using the trended themes. Errors that did not fit into existing categories 
were placed in a miscellaneous category to be analyzed for trends within the 
entire set of errors. These trends were then assigned a category based on the 
representation of errors as they were described in the article. In most instances, an 
article would provide a category for an error that was acceptable or common 
terminology was extracted from the article and later trended through the 
categorization process. In few instances, categories were difficult to distinguish. 
An example would be the category for Social Informatics. This is a difficult 
category to assign because of the ambiguous nature of the issues contained within 
that particular category. This process was employed over three stages with a four 
stage implemented for the development of the taxonomy. The trended categories 
were subsequently audited by a thesis committee member for accuracy in 
representation. 
The master categories (Table 5) were used as initial codes to label the 
errors in each article. The number of errors per category can be found in Table 6 
and the percentage distribution can be viewed in Table 7. Figures 3 – 5 provide 
graphical representations of the distributions. The 11 master categories served as a 
framework and guide for the entire coding process and, as such, warrant further 
description. 
 Automation bias represented 7 percent of the problems associated with 
HIT in the articles and was located in 39 percent of the studies. In most cases, it 
refers to an over-reliance on technology or the assumption that technology is not 
to be questioned. (Campbell et al., 2006) However, this category also refers to 
changes occurring in communication patterns as a result of technology. For 
example, placing an order into the CPOE system does not ensure the order will be 
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seen or acted upon. Another example of automation bias would be the reliance on 
printers printing off orders to be acted upon or printers that act as notifications 
affecting the workflow. In many instances, the printer jams, runs out of paper or 
ceases working for some other reason halting the workflow. An over-reliance on 
technology has also been shown to influence physicians’ decisions adversely 
when using CDS. (Campbell et al., 2007; Goddard, Roudsari, & Wyatt, 2011a, 
2011b, 2012) 
 Cognitive Overload represented only 4 percent of all errors identified, but 
was identified in 17 percent of the studies analyzed. Cognitive overload refers to 
simply having more tasks than one can complete or more information than needed 
for the primary task at hand. (Ash et al., 2004) An example would be a system 
that overloads the user with too much information – most of which is not pertinent 
to the task needing to be completed. Cognitive overload was a category used to 
label errors related to distraction or interruption as well. In addition, it represents 
those instances of when a user made a critical omission (omission error) or failed 
to log off of a system. Alert fatigue – while also a Programming / IT issue – can 
be cross-listed in this category as well. 
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Table 5: Master Categories 
Master Categories Description  
Automation Bias Overreliance or dependence on HIT - this includes human assumptions about the abilities of 
computers in addition to communication issues (i.e. assuming a message sent is a message read) 
Cognitive Overload Includes interruption or distractions and refers to any errors caused as a result of too much 
information or too many tasks at a given time 
Integration of Systems Problems associated with the integration of systems or lack thereof. When systems are improperly 
integrated this often leads to a mismatch in information where results are skewed, images are 
oriented incorrectly, system behavior is not as it was programmed. 
Interface Design / HCI Any issue associated with the GUI causing an error - this should also include information design 
and representation 
Programming / IT Issues related to faults in the programming of the system, testing of the system, rules in the system 
not being set properly, including issues where the system reports incorrect values or misrepresents 
medical information. 
Rigidity of Systems When systems force users to a certain pathway or will not allow variance in a routine. This differs 
from workflow issues where the system simply is mismatched with the workflow causing extra 
effort or time to be spent on tasks. 
Social Informatics Issues involving the interaction of humans and information technology resulting in negative 
emotions, power restructuring, reorganizing etc. 
System Availability  System malfunction (not due to programming error), system outage, system downtime, errors 
caused in updating 
Training / Support IT support and appropriate education / tools in using systems 
Workaround Any deviation from defined process (usually resulting from a workflow issue or a routine that is 
especially time consuming or does not respect the workflow of a complex environment). 
Workflow System design does not reflect or respect the workflow causing time constraints, errors, or 
workarounds in some instances 
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Integration of Systems represented only 5.7 percent of all errors, but was 
identified in a third of all articles. System integration essentially refers to hospital 
systems that do not communicate or, in some instances, communicate 
inappropriately with one another and cause errors. In an example from one article, 
systems would mismatch data and send erroneous data to another system resulting 
in the wrong patient or wrong images being displayed on screen. (Magrabi et al., 
2010) Integration of systems, in this particular article, resulted in patient deaths. 
Most problems were not as serious as this and related to issues such as nursing 
systems not communicating with physicians’ systems or a user having to enter 
information from one system into another manually as a result of disconnected 
systems. A large percentage of this problem relates to the use of appropriate 
languages for system communication such as HL7 and LOINC for laboratory 
data. Using controlled vocabularies and the appropriate terminological sets also 
constitutes a major recommendation for the improvement of future HIT systems 
discussed below. 
 Interface Design / HCI made up the bulk of the errors and adverse 
consequences found representing nearly a quarter of all coded items and found in 
89 percent of all studies. The types of problems identified as a result of interface 
design were broad and represented issues such as juxtaposition errors in selecting 
from dropdown menus, inability to find items within a system, lack of cohesion in 
design and the presentation of data. It is important to note some issues with 
interface design are difficult to analyze and determine whether they are design 
issues or programming issues. For example, fragmented system screens often 
force the user to click through multiple screens in order to gain a complete 
understanding of a given patient’s historical record and often induce error. 
Though this is clearly an interface related issue, it is not always clear if this is the 
result of the way the system was programmed or the manner in which it was 
designed as an interface. In addition, this is an issue where the poor design of the 
interface causes cognitive overload and thus there exists some permeability 
between categories. This is discussed below. 
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 Programming / IT issues related to 13.6 percent of problems identified, but 
these issues were found in 78 percent of all studies analyzed. Programming and IT 
issues referred to system malfunctions, incorrect algorithms in figuring dosages or 
a metrics for patient care, incorrect (or missing) safety parameters and erroneous 
automation settings where the system either automated something it should not 
have or did not automate something it should have. These problems were 
extremely prevalent in the studies and comprise a large portion of problems in 
HIT. Reliability is a serious issue with HIT and putting systems in place with no 
plans for outages or backups posed significant problems and serves as a primary 
recommendation for HIT improvement from a number of researchers in the field. 
(Coiera et al., 2012; Magrabi et al., 2010, 2012; Sittig & Singh, 2009) It also was 
an issue attributed to numerous errors across the studies. 
 Rigidity of Systems only accounted for 7 percent of all errors, but was 
identified in half of the studies analyzed. This concept refers to how flexible or 
“forgiving” a system is in respect to the workflow. It is not a problem with 
workflow as described below, but rather a problem with guidelines enforcement, 
policy enforcement, lack of allowance for process deviation or support of multiple 
tasks or users. Rigidity of Systems can best be described as the system forcing or 
dictating users’ actions and can be considered a subset of programming issues in 
some, but not all, cases. 
 Social Informatics was a small subject category at 3 percent and refers to 
the interaction of humans with a system or technology and its social affects to 
include the emotional impact a system may cause, changing a power structure or 
other behavioral issues resulting from the use or the implementation of 
technology. An example is the restructuring that often occurs as a result of IT 
implementation and how IT can change the power structure in a given 
organization or department. In many instances, nurses who gain mastery of the 
system gain a greater sense of import in a department. This also occurs with IT 
professionals who possess specialized knowledge of a system. (Ash et al., 2006) 
 System Availability represented 11.8 percent of all identified issues, but 
was a problem in half of all studies analyzed. Systems often cease working or 
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develop operational problems taking them “off line.” When this occurs, the 
system is not available or may be unresponsive. This category included items 
such as device failure in the case of BCMA technology, system upgrades that took 
the technology offline and, in some cases, this referred to the physical location of 
systems. System availability was especially a problem in one case where systems 
were not located at bedside. (Niazkhani, Pirnejad, Berg, & Aarts, 2009) This 
forced physicians and nurses to remember orders until they could gain access to a 
system. In some instances, physicians would have to wait until they returned to an 
office. Availability of systems can also become a problem when not enough 
terminals are available in a given department. 
 Training and Support only represented 3.5 percent of all identified HIT 
problems, but was identified in 28 percent of all studies underscoring the 
importance of training on new (and even older) systems. When the 
implementation of systems is considered, training and support have been found to 
be of the utmost importance. (Ash, Stavri, & Kuperman, 2003) Users, in many 
instances, did not understand basic aspects of the system such as ordering 
procedures, which caused errors. In some instances, users did not understand 
organizational policies in regards to using the system. In the use of BCMA 
technology, one study cited users did not understand the safety benefits offered 
through the use of such systems or the importance of using such systems. (Koppel 
et al., 2008) Other issues included ergonomics and computer carts not being well 
designed for use in rooms or to hold charting material for transcription.  
 Workarounds represented 4.8 percent of all categories and were located in 
a third of the studies analyzed. Many of the issues involving workarounds revolve 
around systems being poorly designed or systems that create more/new work for 
the end-user. (Campbell et al., 2006) There were generally two types of 
workarounds – those involving the system and those representing both physical 
and system constraints. Issues involving the system only refer to problems where 
the user would work around the system as a result of the system. An example is 
using excessive cut and paste within the system or finding shortcuts within the 
system that increase the likelihood of error or cause adverse consequences. An 
	   33	  
example of a physical constraint causing a workaround is in one system, nurses 
would borrow medicines from other units’ medicine cabinets and replace them 
later because the CPOE ordering system often took too long to get medicines to 
the floor. Paper persistence was also an issue involving physical artifacts used as a 
workaround where professionals would sometimes keep items on paper and enter 
them in the system later or make changes in a paper chart that were not placed 
into the system causing inconsistencies in the record of care. 
 Workflow problems represented 12.7 percent of all issues identified and 
56 percent of the studies analyzed. The most common problem seen within 
workflow is when the system does not actually match the physical workflow. 
Examples of this include patient location in the hospital either allowing duplicate 
orders (because the patient is able to be accessed in more than one location) or the 
wrong patient being cued into the system as a result of a location mismatch. 
Often, the paper process does not match the system leading to gaps between what 
is seen in the system versus the care documented on paper. The largest number of 
workflow related issues involved how the implementation of the system would 
change the workflow. One example involved a system that could monitor when 
medications were administered and report when medications were administered 
late. This problem is described above in the Background and Literature Review 
section. This was an issue that not only changed workflow (because nurses would 
often delay items that clearly had a higher priority so as not to be reported in the 
system as administering medicine late), but it also can be (and was) categorized as 
a sociotechnical issue due to the anxiety it caused among nurses. In addition, there 
were delays in workflow as a result of systems use. For example, an order might 
not be in the system yet meaning it cannot be acted upon or medication may have 
been ordered but nurses must wait on the physical arrival, which is slower with 
the new system. Interestingly, there were changes in communication patterns that 
affected workflow. But these same issues are also sociotechnical in that the 
technology has an effect on the social aspects of the work environment. 
 These results provide an overview of the types of errors and the 
prevalence of these errors in the studies analyzed. These initial master categories 
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are not exclusive and in many instances, one error can have more than a single 
cause. This is discussed in the Discussion Section below. However, defining and 
identifying major categories of errors found in the literature provides an enhanced 
mental model of the problems facing future HIT use and implementations in the 
United States. 
 
 
Table 6: Distribution of 11 Master Categories 
Master Categories Number of Errors 
(n=228) 
Percentage of 
Errors 
Automation Bias 15 6.6 
Cognitive Overload 9 4.0 
Integration of Systems 13 5.7 
Interface Design / HCI 52 22.8 
Programming / IT 31 13.6 
Rigidity of Systems 16 7.0 
Social Informatics 7 3.0 
System Availability  27 11.8 
Training / Support 8 3.5 
Workaround 11 4.8 
Workflow 29 12.7 
 
Table 7: Percentage Distribution of 11 Master Categories 
Master Categories Number of Studies 
(n=18) 
Percentage of 
Studies 
Automation Bias 7 39 
Cognitive Overload 3 17 
Integration of Systems 6 33 
Interface Design / HCI 16 89 
Programming / IT 14 78 
Rigidity of Systems 9 50 
Social Informatics 3 17 
System Availability  9 50 
Training / Support 5 28 
Workaround 6 33 
Workflow 10 56 
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Figure 3: Number of Errors Per Category 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of Errors per Category  
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Figure 5: Category Percentage Per Study 
 
 
The eleven master categories, representing 228 identified errors, were then 
grouped and used to develop a taxonomic representation of errors – a 
classification schema more precisely representing the overall nature of different 
errors identified. Each of the 11 master categories was evaluated as a sole 
category to identify error trends within the individual category. These trends were 
then placed with each of their respective categories and the 11 master categories 
were then evaluated in a final review to develop a holistic framework for the 
taxonomic representation. Thirty subcategories were identified based on the error 
trends within each of the original 11 master categories. This allowed for a more 
precise schema in terms of a classification system. In three instances, a “master 
category” was grouped into a larger overarching category that more precisely 
represented and described the range of errors found within that category. This 
occurred with three of the eleven master categories. Automation Bias and 
Cognitive Overload were grouped into an overarching category titled the Negative 
Effects of Augmentation because they both represent problems in automation or 
augmentation through the use of technology. Integration of Systems was grouped 
Automation Bias
Cognitive Overload
Integration of Systems
Interface Design / HCI
Programming / IT
Rigidity of Systems
Social Informatics
System Availability 
Training / Support
Workaround
Workflow
0% 22.50% 45.00% 67.50% 90.00%
	   37	  
under the category System Availability primarily because the lack of systems 
integration represents a gap in the availability of a given system from another 
system. The taxonomic representation can be viewed in Table 8 with respective 
descriptions for the 30 subcategories.  
The taxonomic representation provides a more granular view in the sense 
that it provides a division within differing categories. It also provides a greater 
specificity that enables a better understanding of what errors are representing 
within the master categories. This taxonomic representation could be utilized not 
only to provide an understanding and overall picture of HIT-induced errors in 
healthcare, but could also serve as a modeling framework for future categorization 
or research in this area of study. 
 
Table 8: Classification of HIT-Induced Errors 
Classification Description / Examples 
1.0 Interface Design / HCI 
 
 
1.1 Devices Problems in using devices, interpreting 
beeps (BCMA), Ergonomic issues in 
using devices such as carts, computer 
terminals or work areas. 
1.2 Feedback Alerts poorly designed, unclear system 
procedures, unclear update procedures, 
Alert override, Automation surprise 
1.3 Information Design Data presentation confusing, Paper 
labels poorly designed, High priority 
items not accentuated or highlighted 
1.4 Lists Ordering of lists confusing, 
Juxtaposition Errors, Cannot reorder list 
1.5 Navigation Search interface lacking, Unclear log-
off, Labeling confusing 
1.6 System Burdensome Too many steps, Too many clicks, 
Confusing interface 
2.0 Negative Effects of 
Augmentation 
 
 
2.1 Automation Bias Assuming the system is correct (CDS), 
Assuming an order placed is an order 
carried out 
2.2 Brain Plasticity Forgetting previous manual processes 
(i.e. How to do things the old way) 
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2.3 Cognitive Overload Interruption, Distraction, Too much 
information 
2.4 Overuse of Automation Excessive copy and paste, Changing 
clinical orders to standardized (and 
meaningless) phraseology 
3.0 Programming / IT 
 
 
3.1 Erroneous Automation 
Settings 
Orders do not cancel (leading to 
duplicate orders), Medications not 
discontinued by default 
3.2 Incorrect Algorithms / 
Calculations 
Dosing algorithms wrong, Dosing 
measurements incorrectly rounded up, 
Dosing measurements wrong 
3.3 Incorrect Safety 
Parameters 
No time out for log-out, Patients can be 
accessed in more than one location, 
System does not contain 
contraindication data 
3.4 System Malfunction Interface displays wrong information, 
BCMA does not detect wrong patient, 
Incorrect alerts 
4.0 Rigidity of Systems 
 
 
4.1 Data Entry / Guideline 
Enforcement 
Policies and Guidelines force users to 
enter supplementary information, 
Forcing order justification 
4.2 Process Deviation Cannot deviate from set process in 
system, Orders cannot be placed until 
patient registered in system, ER 
situations do not allow flexibility 
4.3 User Management Support for multiple users, Patient 
transfer problems when attached to 
physician and new physician cannot 
enter orders for patient 
5.0 Sociotechnical Issues 
 
 
5.1 Emotional Impact Feelings of resentment or frustration for 
system problems 
5.2 Change in Power 
Structure 
IT or professionals with above average 
technical abilities gain power over other 
workers 
5.3 Changes in 
Communication Patterns 
System eliminates much face-to-face 
interaction. 
 
6.0 System Availability 
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6.1 Device Failure BCMA batteries dead, BCMA failure, 
BCMA not scanning 
6.2 System Down / Offline System upgrades, Complete system 
failure, System down or offline 
6.3 System Integration LIS (or other systems) not integrated 
with EMR 
6.4 System Location System not easily accessible due to 
location of terminal or location of EMR 
access 
6.5 System Speed System too slow or delayed or freezing 
screen 
 
7.0 Workarounds 
 
 
7.1 Physical Constraints Paper persistence  
7.2 System Constraints Not using BCMA, Charting after shift 
 
8.0 Workflow 
 
 
8.1 Mismatched Workflow System does not parallel workflow 
leading to wrong patient, wrong meds or 
patient location problems 
8.2 Paper to System 
Mismatch 
New system leaves some users out of 
process and thus removes checks and 
balances in old paper-based system, 
Paper-based system had a method of 
alerting for X and new system does not 
8.3 System Changes 
Workflow 
System forces change in workflow as a 
result of linear processes 
 
Prevalence and Impact of HIT-Induced Errors  
Introduction  
 Measuring the prevalence and impact of HIT-induced errors can be 
difficult for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it is extremely difficult to 
gage the prevalence or impact of HIT-induced errors beyond this study. In 
addition, the majority of the studies analyzed for this review involved qualitative 
data collection and analysis – the very nature of which made it impossible to 
determine error rates in an accurate manner. There are two primary means to 
determine, on some level, how prevalent these types of errors are and how 
concerned the healthcare profession should be about HIT-induced errors, adverse 
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consequences of HIT and safety issues involving information technologies in 
healthcare. The first means is to evaluate the representation of studies from the 
literature review completed for this study. The second means is to evaluate recent 
events and publications surrounding these issues.  
Prevalence and Impact Within the Study 
Given the rigor of the literature review, it is possible to represent the 
distribution of studies across varying health information technologies and 
illustrate the gaps in the literature. Table 9 provides an overview of the 
technologies covered with the studies analyzed to include the percentile of each 
technology within the 18 studies analyzed. This section covers the technologies 
represented within the study – CPOE, CDS, BCMA and studies examining 
multiple systems in a single study. 
 
Table 9: Representation of HIT in Studies 
HIT System CPOE CDS BCMA Multiple* 
Number of Studies 11 2 4 3 
Percentage of Studies 61% 11% 22% 16.7% 
 
*The “Multiple Category” denotes data pulls from patient safety systems or 
reporting databases such as FDA, MEDMARX, AIMS. 
Clinical Decision Support Systems 
CDS is an underrepresented topic. This is most likely due to the nature of 
CDS in that most studies analyzing the effects of CDS examine automation bias 
in relation to how the system can influence the decisions of healthcare 
professionals. A large majority of studies located via the literature search 
examining CDS were conducted in test environments and were thus excluded 
from this study. Most often, the tests were conducted as part of a usability 
analysis or a simulation. The 2 studies included in this review evaluating CDS 
were part of a CPOE system evaluation and thus are pulled out from the original 
18 studies evaluated so there is an accurate representation of CDS as a technology 
represented in the studies. 
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Bar Code Medication Administration Technologies 
BCMA is a relatively underrepresented topic in the literature as well. Of 
the four studies analyzing BCMA, one was a case study offering a singular 
incident. One was a study using a MEDMARX dataset (Cochran et al., 2007) 
evaluating 2,783 error reports and representing the largest dataset for the BCMA 
studies analyzed. However, large datasets from databases do not always offer the 
depth of explanation one might obtain through qualitative research methods such 
as ethnography, interviews and observation. By far, the most rigorous study 
conducted was by Ross Koppel and his colleagues. (Koppel et al., 2008) This 
study evaluated BCMA in the context of workarounds (the most common 
problem with BCMA technology along with failure of the device) using 
qualitative methods of data gathering and log review, which is arguably 
quantitative in nature. There were a number of viewpoint pieces, editorial spots 
and commentaries available on BCMA, but the number of high quality studies 
located for this thesis was low.  
Multiple Technologies Studied 
There were three studies that examined errors and patient safety incidents 
across a number of technologies. (Ash et al., 2004; Magrabi et al., 2010, 2012) 
Two of these studies analyzed a large data set pulled from the FDA and another 
pulled from AIMS patient safety incident reporting database in Australia. 
(Magrabi et al., 2010, 2012) In all, these two studies evaluated 559 adverse events 
reported in AIMS and MAUDE and included a broad range of technologies to 
include Patient Information Systems, BCMA, EMR and CPOE. In addition, these 
two datasets represent an international crosscut of data and a cross-section of 
HIT-induced errors by technology. Joan Ash and colleagues also conducted a 
study at an international level gathering qualitative and quantitative data from US 
hospitals, Australia and the Netherlands. This was a rich dataset used to examine 
the unintended consequences of Patient Care Information Systems (PCIS) and 
related errors. 
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Table 10: Distribution of Errors Per Study 
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Automation Bias X  X   X   X X   X    X  
Cognitive Overload           X     X X  
Integration of Systems   X X     X  X X       
Interface Design X X X X X  X X X X X X  X X X X  
Programming / IT X X X X    X X  X X  X X X  X 
Rigidity of Systems X  X X   X   X  X     X X 
Social Informatics  X X    X           X 
System Availability    X  X  X  X X X X   X    
Training / Support  X      X  X X     X   
Workaround X  X  X    X     X X    
Workflow X X X X X  X  X X  X  X X   X 
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Computerized-Provider Order Entry 
CPOE, by far, represented the largest amount of the literature located for 
HIT-induced errors and adverse consequences. The majority of the studies 
excluded, often reported on a small subset of errors in the use of CPOE and there 
are a number of reviews on CPOE that included a section concerning errors as 
well. These studies did not meet exclusion criteria in most instances because they 
did not provide adequate explanations for the errors, represented an incomplete 
accounting of errors or simply did not meet inclusion criteria in other ways. The 
CPOE literature, however, is robust in terms of reporting on the errors associated 
with this technology. And, once again, Ross Koppel and colleagues’ work in this 
field represent a very good foundation. (Koppel et al., 2005) 
The Prevalence and Impact of HIT-Induced Errors in the Literature 
 There are a numerous authoritative organizations and medical research 
scientists currently voicing concern over the errors occurring in relation to 
technologies in healthcare. The literature is rife with such examples from 
organizations such as the Institutes for Medicine (IOM), The Joint Commission 
and The Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI).  
 IOM has published two books on the errors in healthcare and associated 
problems with technology. (Crossing the Quality Chasm :a New Health System 
for the 21st Century, 2001; Kohn et al., 2000) But, a more recent report focuses 
specifically on HIT-induced errors and makes recommendations for safe 
implementation and use of HIT. (Safety et al., 2012) In this report, the IOM 
states: 
 
“The portfolio of research on health IT has included little regarding the 
general impact of health IT on safety of clinical care. The evidence in the 
literature about the impact of health IT on patient safety is mixed but shows 
that the challenges facing safer healthcare and safer use of health IT involve 
the people and clinical implementation as much as the technology.” 
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 The Joint Commission, however, cites statistics on the matter and has 
recently published two major reports regarding the safety of health IT. 
(Commission, 2009; The Joint Commision, 2009) In one report, they also note a 
scarcity of data on the subject and state: 
“The United States Pharmacopeia MEDMARX database includes 
176,409 medication error records for 2006, of which 1.25 percent 
resulted in harm. Of those medication error records, 43,372, or 
approximately 25 percent, involved some aspect of computer technology 
as at least one cause of the error. Most  of the harmful technology-related 
errors involved mislabeled barcodes on medications (5 percent), 
information management systems (2 percent), and unclear or confusing 
computer screen displays (1.5 percent). The remaining harmful errors 
were related to  dispensing devices, computer software, failure to  scan  
barcodes, computer entry (other than CPOE), CPOE, and overrides of 
barcode warnings.”  (Commission, 2009)  
 
Though a dearth of data and statistics exist on HIT-induced errors and adverse 
consequences in healthcare, these major reports from authoritative bodies in the 
industry suggest there is, at the very least, significant concern over widespread 
implementation of IT in healthcare over the next decade. The IOM has formed a 
committee (or task force) on the subject to make recommendations for safer use 
and implementation of HIT. (Safety et al., 2012) 
In recent literature, there have been voices of prominent researchers in the 
medical field exploring a number of related issues to HIT-induced errors and HIT 
implementations. Dean Sittig and Hardeep Singh have recently authored a paper 
in which they provide insight to defining HIT-induced errors and a framework for 
deployment and implementation of HIT. (Sittig & Singh, 2011) In addition, they 
have also authored a publication detailing eight major principles in safe electronic 
health record use. (2009) Enrico Coiera and his colleagues have also authored a 
commentary paper in which they address issues and problems in HIT and the 
rocky road ahead as a nation strives to bring healthcare technologies into the new 
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millennium. (Coiera et al., 2012) Ben-Tzion Karsh has published a viewpoint 
paper that not only underscores the problems in HIT, but also seeks to correct the 
fallacies associated with HIT such as the idea that no risk exists or that humans 
can be to blame for HIT-induced errors and adverse consequences. (Karsh et al., 
2010) This paper also explores an emerging idea in proposing EMR, CPOE, CDS 
and BCMA technologies should be brought under the regulation of the Food and 
Drug Administration.  
If the trends in the literature and governing bodies are any indication of 
importance in relation to HIT-induced errors, it appears it is of significant concern 
and importance. Yet, there remain little quantitative measures to assess how 
prevalent or how pervasive HIT-induced errors are in medicine or how great the 
impact. We can – at this point – merely speculate that Meaningful Use and the 
HITECH act will spawn widespread implementation and adoption of technologies 
that may or may not result in significantly greater harm than what is currently 
cited in the medical literature. At best, we can only hope the current research 
surrounding HIT-induced errors will provide a portal with which to view what 
could exponentially become problematic in healthcare systems and facilities 
across the country. 
Recommended Actions and Best Practices in Addressing HIT-Induced 
Errors 
 All 18 studies were analyzed for recommendations and any 
recommendations were then compiled and trended in the final analysis of each 
study (Table 11). Of the 18 studies, 3 provided no recommendations or best 
practices to follow. Of the remaining 15 articles, a total of 84 recommendations 
were identified, compiled and analyzed for trends. Seventeen recommendations 
were identified across the studies – not all of which concurred with other studies 
(or trended). But all recommendations were represented.  
Improving the interface design was the single greatest recommendation 
and was made across 8 of the studies. (Ash et al., 2004; Campbell et al., 2006; 
Cochran et al., 2007; Horsky, Kuperman, & Patel, 2005; Magrabi et al., 2010, 
2012; Patterson, 2002; Wetterneck et al., 2011) This included problems with 
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labeling where it could possibly confuse users such as mg versus g or IV versus 
IP and writing these values out instead of using abbreviations, (Cochran et al., 
2007; Horsky et al., 2005; Magrabi et al., 2010) systems interfaces that can 
remind users what they were last doing if interrupted, (Ash et al., 2004) and 
system interfaces that do not force users to move across several screens to obtain 
a historical account of a patient situation. (Magrabi et al., 2012; Patterson, 2002) 
Another recommendation was to highlight high-risk medications within the 
system interface. (Wetterneck et al., 2011) Alerts were also targeted by several 
studies asking for improvement of alerts design and activation so as to reduce 
alert fatigue and avoid excessive alert overrides. (Ash et al., 2004; Cochran et al., 
2007; Horsky et al., 2005; Walsh et al., 2006) 
Greater attention to training and educating the end-user was 
recommended. (Ash et al., 2004; Cochran et al., 2007; Horsky et al., 2005; 
Magrabi et al., 2010; Patterson, 2002; Santell et al., 2009) This included training 
the end-user in safety features of the system, spending more time on training and 
special attention to training during new installations or significant upgrades. One 
study called for increased investigation of workarounds involving the use of 
BCMA systems and subsequently training users on the appropriate procedures. 
(Cochran et al., 2007) It is important to note while training and education are 
important parts of an implementation of HIT, they in no way substitute or replace 
solid system design. Workarounds are often a symptom of poor system design and 
users cannot and should not simply be trained to manage poor design. 
There was a significant call for standards or the application of standards in 
interface design efforts or standards in system development for HIT. (Campbell et 
al., 2009; Han et al., 2005; Koppel et al., 2008; Magrabi et al., 2010, 2012; 
Wetterneck et al., 2011) More research into the use of HIT, behavior surrounding 
the use of HIT and the employment of workarounds was also a major 
recommendation. (Ash et al., 2004; Campbell et al., 2009; Cochran et al., 2007; 
Eslami, Abu-Hanna, de Keizer, & de Jonge, 2006; Koppel, 2005; Koppel et al., 
2008) Improvements in CDS to include a call for more robust CDS, using patient-
specific information to advise physicians of guidelines and better medication 
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decision support were recommendations as well. (Eslami et al., 2006; Santell et 
al., 2009; Walsh et al., 2006; Wetterneck et al., 2011) 
Less frequent recommendations included greater attention to developing 
systems that compliment workflow, improving integration of systems, involving 
end-users in the design process (participatory design) and careful scrutiny of 
policies that would drive design or change the workflow.  
 
Table 11: Study Recommendations for HIT Improvement 
Recommendation Publications 
Interface Design  Ash (2004), Campbell (2006), 
Cochran, Horsky, Magrabi (2010), 
Magrabi (2012), Patterson, 
Wetterneck 
Training & Education Ash (2004), Cochran, Horsky, 
Magrabi (2010), Patterson, Santell 
UI Standards or System Standards Campbell (2009), Han, Kopell 
(2008), Magrabi (2010), Magrabi 
(2012), Wetterneck 
More HIT Research on Workarounds, 
User Behavior or HIT Use 
Ash (2004), Campbell (2009), 
Cochran, Eslami, Koppel (2005), 
Koppel (2008) 
Improved CDS  Eslami, Santell, Walsh, Wetterneck 
System Design to Meet Workflow Ash (2004), Koppel (2008), Magrabi 
(2012), Patterson 
Participatory Design Ash (2004), Campbell (2006), 
Campbell (2009)  
System Integration Campbell (2009), Magrabi (2010), 
Santell 
Increased and Careful Scrutiny of 
Policies Driving Design 
Campbell (2009), Patterson, 
Wetterneck 
Continuous Improvement and 
Monitoring of Implementations 
Koppel (2005), Santell, Wetterneck 
Increase Open Workspace and Lines of 
Communication Between Professionals 
Campbell (2009), Patterson 
Stable IT and Network Infrastructure Magrabi (2010), Magrabi (2012) 
Improved Safety Features in System Magrabi (2010), Magrabi (2012) 
Flexible Systems allow Deviation from 
Workflow 
Patterson, Santell 
Improved testing prior to 
implementation 
Koppel (2008) 
Back-up or Mirror System for 
Downtime 
Magrabi (2010) 
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 In addition to the recommendations identified in the studies analyzed for 
this thesis, there are a number of other recommendations from work that has been 
published recently or organizations that have published guidelines. These 
recommendations are concurrent with the recommendations from the analysis of 
the 18 studies selected for this thesis. 
 A recent paper published in the Journal of the American Medical 
Informatics Association outlined three primary recommendations: (Karsh et al., 
2010) 
1. Using multidisciplinary teams to develop and analyze information systems 
and technology used in healthcare. The recommended experts for teams 
include human factors engineers, applied psychologists, medical 
sociologists, communication scientists, cognitive scientists and interaction 
designers. 
2. Increased research in “how clinical work is actually done and should be 
done.” This research, according to the article, should be conducted using 
cognitive field analyses, cognitive work analysis, cognitive task analysis, 
workflow and task analysis and usability testing to develop detailed 
metrics into system use and clinical workflows. 
3. The measurements to determine meaningful use should ensure what is 
measured actually allow a determination of whether the use is meaningful 
or not. 
 
Another recent publication called for more precise metrics in tracking 
rates of harm and adverse events related to HIT. (Coiera et al., 2012) In addition, 
this article also urged the profession to develop means of examining the root 
cause of events and to enact methods that will allow overrides in the event of 
catastrophic failures in a system.  
An article from the Journal of the American Medical Association outlines 
8 guiding principles for safe implementation and use of HIT. (Sittig & Singh, 
2009) They are: 
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1. Choosing the right hardware and software to ensure stability of systems 
and no interruption in workflow;  
2. Ensuring the right content exists by choosing the right controlled 
vocabularies and medical terminological sets; 
3. Developing the correct user interface to allow for simpler assimilation and 
interpretation of complex information sets; 
4. Appropriately trained and educated personnel who understand the uses of 
the system to include clinicians and IT professionals; 
5. The correct workflow and communication between professionals should 
be tested prior to system implementation and the system should not hinder 
such activities; 
6. The organizational culture should be one of safety and have an attitude 
conducive to continual quality improvement; 
7. The right regulations and policies can improve the state of healthcare 
including federal regulations and state regulations. These regulations 
should strive for safety as a primary concern; 
8. The right monitoring to include pre-implementation and post-
implementation inspections, certifying organizations for healthcare 
technologies and a call for hazard reporting databases from vendors will 
greatly increase the safety of HIT. 
 
The Joint Commission has also made a set of recommendations in a recent 
Sentinel Alert. (Commission, 2009) These recommendations total 13 and are 
supported in the literature as well as being concurrent with the 
recommendations above. They include: 
1. Mapping the workflow prior to systems implementation to avoid 
costly and dangerous errors; 
2. Involving clinicians in the design process and seeking their input; 
3. Assessing organizational IT needs beforehand and encouraging IT 
professionals to seek use cases beyond their organization; 
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4. Increased monitoring during implementation phases and increased 
available support to end-users; 
5. Developing tailored training for clinicians of all types; 
6. Ensuring policies dictate staff to contact for support; 
7. Ensuring all order sets and guidelines are tested on paper and approved 
prior to “going live” with the system; 
8. Improving alert systems using a “graduated set” of increasing alerts 
(improved algorithms based on priority of alert); 
9. Irregular medication orders or those that circumvent normal routine 
should be reviewed by pharmacy; 
10. Minimizing distractions at computer terminals and stations; 
11. Continuously monitoring for safety events after implementation; 
12. Monitoring and investigating adverse events and near misses; 
13. Reevaluating systems for security, safety and HIPAA compliance 
when new technologies are connected to or added to the existing 
system. 
 
The IOM has also made recommendations in “Health IT and Patient Safety: 
Building Safer Systems for Better Care.” (Safety et al., 2012) This publication 
spans more than 200 pages and represents a committee of healthcare professionals 
tasked with identifying the requirements for building safer HIT. These 
recommendations follow suit with the recommendations listed above. The 
committee specifically underscores systems integration (interoperability and 
language bridging terminologies such as LOINC) and user interface design as 
primary focal points to improving HIT. In addition, they make specific 
recommendations for the process of implementation and testing of systems to 
include recommendations targeting proprietary vendors. They also outline “Eight 
Golden Rules of Interface Design.”  
Designing for consistency is the first recommendation and refers to 
consistency of the interface where controls for completing actions are consistent, 
data displays are consistent and there is a general sense of cohesion in the 
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system’s interface. A second recommendation is to develop a sense of 
“international usability” so the system is easy to use for those with less experience 
and there are shortcuts for expert users. Developing feedback that actually 
informs the user as to why the error occurred and what actions can be taken to 
correct it is a rule as well. Using prompts within the system to guide the user, 
providing feedback and informing the user when actions (or series of actions) are 
complete acts as the fourth rule. Building a system that prevents errors is also a 
rule. This is a recommendation that states contextual awareness is important when 
developing choices in a system and allowing commands that can conflict or cause 
problems should be avoided. Allowing forgiveness (the ability to correct one’s 
actions) for errors is the sixth rule. Supporting an internal locus of control 
comprises the seventh rule and refers to avoiding automation surprise in a system. 
Last, interfaces that require a professional to remember large amounts of 
information in order to complete an action (cognitive overload) should be avoided 
as well.  
The recommendations from within the study and those published in articles or 
formal recommendations from prominent organizations within healthcare were 
concurrent on a number of topics. By far, user interface design and better 
interface development was a top recommendation. Human-Computer Interaction 
and good interface design are key concepts in building better and safer systems as 
they have a high representation in the literature surrounding both HIT-induced 
errors and patient safety related to technology. The development of interface 
testing standards and checklists for interface development are both trending 
recommendations as well as methods enabling better interface design with fewer 
error-prone systems. Developing systems with a solid IT infrastructure that are 
reliable and result in no unexpected downtime is a realistic requirement in the 
world of technology today with mirror systems and back-up systems to aid in 
emergency situations. Solid software development is a closely associated 
requirement that is often included in solid IT infrastructure and has been 
mentioned as inherent to safe HIT in a number of studies and article 
recommendations. Solid software development is an overarching category 
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including not only the development cycle of the software, but also key 
improvements in programming with increased functionality around CDS, safety 
features built into systems and improved feedback mechanisms to include better 
alerts, tiered alerts that are progressive in the severity of warnings and clear 
directives programmed into the software. Systems also need to have an ability to 
exchange information through the use of common and available health 
terminologies – a concept often referred to in this thesis as systems integration. 
Modeling the appropriate workflow is also a prevalent recommendation and 
involves appropriate requirements gathering as well as pre-implementation and 
post-implementation testing procedures that are rigorous. This also includes a top 
recommendation in the constant monitoring of systems for safety issues and 
timely response to issues compromising patient safety or safety within the system. 
Best practices will also heavily involve the users through participatory design and 
multi-disciplinary teams aiding in the development of new systems and 
improvement of existing systems. Finally, training is a trend within the literature 
and training should be tailored appropriately for specific groups. Out-of-the-box 
training programs and one-size-fits-all approaches are problematic and result in 
educational gaps for the end-users. 
These recommendations are a positive step forward in developing a set of best 
practices in building, implementing and improving the safety of HIT in 
healthcare. Developing a set of regulatory requirements that are steeped in best 
practices and derived from known safety issues in the literature will provide the 
first layer of a solid foundation for better systems, better care and safer practice. 
Discussion 
 This study sought to evaluate the negative effects of HIT through an 
integrative literature review, qualitative data analysis and the development of a 
taxonomic classification system of HIT-induced errors as reported in the 
literature. In addition, this study also sought to both identify the prevalence and 
impact of HIT-induced errors as well as identify the recommended best practices 
in addressing these types of errors. This discussion will serve as a commentary on 
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the literature review, the data analysis, the prevalence and impact of HIT and the 
recommended best practices. 
 Eighteen studies were located for this review – two of which were small 
case studies, but worthy of inclusion. As noted in several of the articles evaluated, 
the research on HIT-induced errors and adverse consequences is entirely too 
small. (Ash et al., 2004; Campbell et al., 2009; Cochran et al., 2007; Eslami et al., 
2006; Koppel et al., 2005; Koppel et al., 2008) To be fair, this is a difficult area to 
study and reporting standards are far from perfect. (Coiera et al., 2012) The 
reporting of errors related to technology can provide heightened insight as to the 
causes and means to address them in future system development. Though 
reporting systems do exist, many are voluntary but still provide rich data with 
which to view HIT-induced errors. These methods informed 5 of the 18 studies. 
The primary means of data gathering was qualitative with observations, 
ethnographies, chart reviews and user interviews common across the studies. 
These methods and types of studies are not always easy to get approval for and 
thus may account for the small number of studies available in the medical 
literature. However, another problem is the nature of gaining data in a real 
environment where error is concerned. A good number of studies using 
simulations or usability testing were located when executing the literature review. 
But these studies were excluded. While the literature review did result in a large 
set of data and clear trends were seen within the data, the amount of research in 
this field is disappointing given the severity of the topic. 
 The data analysis for this study resulted in 8 primary categories and 30 
subcategories within the primary categories. These categories were not only 
validated by the trending within the studies selected for review, but also by the 
authors of the studies and the recommendations for improved HIT from sources 
beyond the studies themselves. These categories provide a clear lens into the 
nature of errors in healthcare caused by HIT as well as a reference for future 
research in this area. As could be expected, the majority of the problems were 
technical in nature involving poor interface design, faulty programming or IT that 
simply was not reliable enough to support a high reliability organization like 
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healthcare. But issues such as systems mismatching the workflow, humans who 
found ways to work around systems and improper training, also compounded 
these problems. Also revealed were sociotechnical issues and unintended 
consequences as a result of HIT implementation. The results of the data analysis 
are not particularly surprising. There are a number of industries where automation 
has caused the same dire consequences such as the aviation industry and nuclear 
power plants. (Karsh et al., 2010) The problems in these examples were 
sometimes of a greater consequence and danger than the issues involving HIT-
induced errors. These industries were able to overcome this through the 
investigation and re-modeling of errors along with involving subject experts such 
as human factors engineers, psychologist and sociologists. Thus the data analyzed 
in this study serves as a step in addressing and understanding the nature of HIT-
induced errors. 
  It was possible to gain insight into the prevalence and impact of HIT-
induced errors through the literature review for this study analyzing the 
representation of studies per technology. Additionally, it was possible to ascertain 
the significance of the subject through publications and works not included in the 
literature review for this study. With the exception of CPOE, there was minimal 
representation of CDS, BCMA and studies evaluating all technologies (or 
multiple system types) as a singular study analysis. A number of authors from the 
integrated review studies made recommendations for more research in this area. 
The integration of standards and increased research are also priorities for 
organizations with oversight of the safety and improvement of healthcare and 
standards. (Armijo, McDonnell, & Werner, 2009; Commission, 2009; Safety et 
al., 2012; Schumacher & Lowry, 2010) Though it is difficult to gain any 
quantitative sense of the impact of HIT-induced errors in the industry, these 
studies, publications and calls for research and standards serve as a marker for the 
significance of the subject. However, the lack of solid quantitative research with 
the ability to gain some measure of precision in regards to the prevalence and 
impact of HIT-induced errors is disappointing in an industry where metrics and 
scientific measurement are foundational to the profession. It will be difficult – if 
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not impossible – to determine whether any movement forward in developing and 
maintaining health information technologies has had a positive or negative impact 
without an accurate baseline. The baseline with which to measure any 
improvements in healthcare technologies can only be established through accurate 
representations or metrics of where the technologies stand today.  
This study identified numerous sets of recommendations from the studies 
identified in the literature review, from prominent researchers in the profession 
and authoritative organizations within the healthcare industry. Of the numerous 
recommendations identified, there was considerable concurrence among them. 
The recommendations also concur (or address) the errors identified as a result of 
this study. These recommendations from groups such as the IOM represent a step 
forward for the healthcare industry in addressing the adverse effects of HIT. 
However, it is disappointing in an industry so steeped in regulation, 
measurements and standards that there has not been a push for EMR standards 
until recently. HealthIT.gov is a step in the right direction providing guidance for 
practices and organizations. But it remains to be seen whether the standards put in 
place for Meaningful Use Criteria will have the desired impact or the specificity 
to address the major problems HIT has encountered over the past decade. 
Moreover, these standards are still in a state of flux, untested and have not been 
validated. There is reason to be positive and some recent publications show HIT 
as having significant benefits. (Buntin, Burke, Hoaglin, & Blumenthal, 2011; 
Chaudhry et al., 2006; Shekelle, Morton, & Keeler, 2006) But as American 
Medical Informatics Association noted in a recent publication, (Bloomrosen et al., 
2011) there has not been enough research into the effects of HIT and much of the 
research has been completed during a period of slow HIT uptake. The 
development of rigorous standards that can be measured and show clear benefits 
as well as standards that will address the adverse effects of HIT still remain a spot 
on the horizon.  
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Limitations of Study 
There are a number of limitations of this study – the foremost of which is 
the ability to “map an error.” Reason’s Model of Human Error and the Swiss 
Cheese Model note an error is not normally the result of a single cause, but a 
number of conditions, which when met, all converge to form an error. In short, an 
error is difficult to attribute to a single cause. This makes it difficult to categorize 
an error with a single label. There are many errors identified within the studies 
that were either difficult to determine any cause for or difficult to label with a 
single cause. Many errors are the result of federal regulations, guidelines or 
institutional policies guiding the design of the system. A number of the errors 
identified, for example, started with interface design problems and cascaded into 
other categories such as workflow, cognitive overload or a workaround. The 
taxonomic representation addresses this factor in some respects. But, a taxonomy 
that provides a cross-listing or cross-directory may help in alleviating the problem 
of mapping an error. 
 This study limited the literature search to the past decade, in part, to 
address the slow uptake of HIT in the nineties and also to ensure the progress in 
HIT was represented in the selected studies. However, there has still been a 
relatively slow adoption of HIT in even the past decade. (Jha et al., 2009) This 
poses an obvious limitation in evaluating HIT use and implementations. There 
may not be a representative sample yet available in which to evaluate the errors or 
adverse effects of HIT in healthcare. In addition, only 7 of the 18 studies – less 
than half – represented more than a single institution. The nature of this type of 
research and the subject matter makes collecting data problematic. The lack of 
representative research on a wide scale and the slow adoption of HIT is a 
limitation that currently cannot be overcome. It is, however, not a limitation that 
in any way reduces the importance of this work or negates reasons for pursuing 
the problems evident in what research does exist. 
There is, generally speaking, a lack of quantitative means to measure the 
impact or improvement in HIT-induced errors. This compounds the problems in 
setting standards or developing guidelines to the improve HIT. Whether 
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Meaningful Use will result in “meaningful measurements” or insights into the 
associated problems in HIT and the impact remain to be seen.  
Though there are obvious limitations to the nature of this work and 
research in this particular area of healthcare, it does not suggest one should adopt 
a nihilist perspective and ignore the obvious warning signs in an industry with 
marked struggles ahead of it in the next decade. The limitations exist as they do 
and identifying them provides an opportunity to minimize or eliminate them for 
better healthcare in the future.  
Future Research 
 Future research into the adverse effects of HIT should move in a number 
of directions. First and foremost, the studies and research that have been 
completed should continue and there clearly needs to be more of it. In addition, 
representations and descriptions of the types of errors and adverse consequences 
of HIT should be a continuing agenda in healthcare as these are means to 
understand the nature and cause of the errors. Whether these representations exist 
in the form of taxonomies or as a guidebook of errors, does not matter so much as 
that they exist and are used to inform future guidelines and recommendations. In 
addition, research into the specific technologies used in healthcare could provide 
additional insight into the types of errors. For example, evaluating interface 
design and usability studies of HIT can inform the current research with more 
granular data. Evaluating only BCMA and the errors and usability issues can 
provide more granular data related to only that technology. Research like this 
would allow representations such as that of Magarabi and colleagues (Magrabi et 
al., 2010, 2011, 2012) and the research conducted in this thesis to be filled in with 
more detail. Finally, there is an obvious limitation to the metrics and 
measurements to ascertain the impacts of HIT, the errors resulting from HIT and 
whether recommended guidelines will actually impact baseline measurements. 
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Conclusion 
 The results of this study indicate there is significant reason to warrant 
concern in evaluating HIT-induced errors and adverse consequences. This study 
located 18 articles and 228 identified adverse effects of HIT in healthcare 
including technologies such as CPOE, CDS, BCMA and studies evaluating 
multiple systems. These adverse effects trended and were cohesive allowing the 
development of a classification and taxonomic representation of adverse effects 
within HIT. This study also serves as a window into viewing the prevalence and 
impact of HIT-induced errors and adverse consequences as well as providing 
recommendations for the improvement of such technologies in healthcare.  
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